Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the always challenging and important subject of Defense acquisition management. As you are well aware, the cost, quality and need for military equipment and supplies have been contentious issues in this country for over 200 years. In FY 1999, the Department of Defense bought about $140 billion in goods and services, in 14.8 million purchasing actions. The complexity, variety, scale and frequent instability of Defense acquisition programs pose particularly daunting management challenges. Today, those challenges are centered more than ever on the need to strike difficult balances, such as: ■ maintaining technological superiority, but not over designing weapon and information systems so that they are unaffordable; ■ expediting the development and production of systems so that our forces have the best available equipment, without rushing untested systems prematurely into production and use;
achieving standardization to reduce costs and logistics problems, without stifling innovation and short changing genuinely unique requirements;
purchasing supplies quickly to ensure rapid response to the needs of the operating units, without paying exorbitant prices or over buying because of poor analysis of requirements and prices;
ensuring high quality for all material on which our military forces depend, without over prescribing details related to design, content and production methods;
improving Defense acquisition results by learning from best practices in the commercial sector, without trying to adopt practices that may not be appropriate or readily adaptable to the public sector;
Reducing the red tape and streamlining overly bureaucratic processes without weakening essential management controls and de-emphasizing due diligence in handling public There continue to be conflicting priorities for audits, such as information security, readiness issues and financial reporting.
Last year, the DoD decided not to proceed with most of the planned continued reduction of the IG budget, which had already been reduced by 26 percent since 1995. Unfortunately, the appropriations committees cut our FY 2000 request, which hampers our ability to do more in vital areas like acquisition. We hope to be able to better explain our resource situation this year and to achieve congressional support of our FY 2001 budget request.
In addition to audit and investigative efforts, the IG role in acquisition management improvement includes reviewing all proposed legislative and regulatory changes. The Department has been generally responsive to our advice on such matters and congressional committees also request our views on acquisition legislation issues on a routine basis.
To study acquisition issues, identify opportunities for reform, suggest specific actions, plan implementation strategies or monitor progress, the Department often forms cross- Deliverables from contracts for services often are not as tangible as hardware, such as a missile or even a set of tires.
Quantifiable information on requirements, performance and costs frequently is harder to develop, and overworked contracting personnel are more likely to give priority attention to equipment procurements than to mundane contracting actions for consulting services or information systems support. Also, except for travel and transportation services, the increased efficiencies derived from e-commerce pertain much more to goods than to services. We believe that, because of these factors, DoD managers and contracting personnel were not putting sufficient priority during the 1990's on this sector of Defense acquisition, which likewise was virtually ignored for the first few years of recent acquisition reform efforts. Consequently, we think the risk of waste in this area is higher than has been commonly realized.
The awareness of the need for more emphasis on services contracts has been growing over the past year, in part because of two major audits, whose results I would like to summarize for you.
Multiple Award Task Regarding the failure to compete task orders, I believe the causes were somewhat vague regulations, pressure to make task order awards rapidly, and perhaps excessive workload in some contracting offices.
In response to the audit findings, the Director for Defense
Procurement has been gathering information from the Military
Departments on the need to establish a competition goal for task orders on multiple award contracts-we had suggested that We made numerous recommendations to management to address these problems, stressing the paramount need for more effective training. Many cost-reimbursable contracts for repetitive tasks should be converted to more economical fixed price contracts.
We also endorsed establishing centers of excellence, which in this case would be specialized contracting organizations or cadre, as a means of developing in-depth expertise on the services markets and on services contracting techniques. We understand that this concept has proven highly beneficial for private sector businesses that purchase large volumes and Continuing Spare Parts Pricing Issues. In early 1998, we began issuing a series of audit reports on prices paid for aviation spare parts and equipment. As you may recall from congressional hearings at the time and intermittent publicity since, we found that prices paid under new, commercial type contracting arrangements were considerably higher than was the case when the same items were procured previously under "traditional" Defense contracts or ordering agreements. In one case, DoD paid modestly discounted, but still excessive, contractor catalog prices that were $4.5 million (280 percent) higher than fair and reasonable prices for $6.1 million of commercial items from one supplier.
Although the Department has been generally responsive to the problems that we have identified on individual contracts, new examples continue to surface as we do additional audits. We have issued 5 more reports on spare parts in the last two years.
One report provided good news and the other four described problems. Most recently, in a pair of reports issued a few days ago, we discussed pricing in a prototype contract for supply support from what the DoD refers to as a virtual prime vendor.
Under this concept, one vendor anticipates DoD needs for a specified list of commodities and assumes responsibility for having inventory on hand to meet those needs, using a range of modern commercial business practices and techniques.
Theoretically, considerable savings should result from shifting the burden of carrying inventory to the vendor.
As with many prototypes, the terms of this particular contract needed some adjustments. The audit indicated that DoD was paying 3 8 percent more than necessary for a variety of aviation components and spares. The most egregious example was a propeller blade heater for C-130 and P-3 aircraft. We calculated that the $1.4 million paid in 1998 for blade heaters was from 124 to 148 percent more than fair and reasonable prices. Although management did not agree with many of our exact calculations, the Department fully agreed with our recommendation to use an entirely different contracting approach, namely, a long-term strategic supplier alliance. In fact, initial meetings with the contractor to explore that approach were held during the audit.
There are a variety of problems to be addressed in spare parts procurement. First, the Government must learn to be a smarter buyer in terms of pooling its purchases to maximize its market 99-218, Sole-Source Noncommercial Spare Parts Orders on a Basic Ordering Agreement (7/21/99). The DoD paid $4.9 million (18 percent) more than fair and reasonable prices for $32.2 million of aviation spares on a basic ordering agreement during fiscal years 1996 through 1998. 00-088, DoD Acquisition Workforce Reduction Trends and Impacts (2/29/00). The Department needs to reconsider the appropriate size and skills mix of the acquisition workforce, which has been cut in half without significant workload reduction and faces future skills shortages. 00-098, Spare Parts and Logistics Support Procured on a Virtual Prime Vendor Contract (3/8/00). A long term alliance arrangement would be preferable to the contractual terms under which overpriced aviation spares were purchased in 1997 and 1998.
(Report currently available only in a For Official Use Only version.) 00-099, Procurement of the Blade Heaters for the C-130 and P-3 Aircraft (3/8/00). This report discusses one of the overpriced spare parts procured under the contract that is evaluated in Report No. 00-098.
(Report currently available only in a For Official Use Only version.) 00-100, Award and Administration of Contracts for Professional, Administrative and Management Support Services (3/10/00) . The Military Departments needed to put more emphasis on all aspects of procurement planning, contracting and contract administration for services.
